Working Papers

Driving the Drivers: Algorithmic Assignment in Ride-Hailing, with Yao Luo and Zhe Yuan [SSRN], Revision requested at IJIO

• Presented at the Canadian Economic Association, China-VIOS, NBER SI Digitization, the Paris Conference on Digital Economics, IIOC 2023, the BU Platform Strategy Symposium, CESI, CES-NA, NASM, ASSA 2024, Digital Economics Conference at Toulouse School of Economics, Peking University, Vanderbilt University, the University at Buffalo, HKUST, Shanghai Jiaotong University, the University of Toronto, Western University, Zhejiang University, Stony Brook University, and Caltech.

Platform Information Provision and Consumer Search: A Field Experiment, with Lu Fang, Chiara Farronato, and Zhe Yuan [Feb. 2024]

• Presented at Bocconi University (workshop on digital markets), 2024 Digital Economy Workshop, HFUT, IIOC 2024, BU Platform Strategy Research Symposium 2024, ASSA 2025, NBER SI Digitization.

Empowering Inclusive Work, with Mitchell Hoffman, Huilan Xu, and Zhe Yuan [Jun. 2026]

• Presented at Toronto, Bocconi, EIEF, UC Riverside, Zurich, Lausanne, Gothenburg, Cornell, Buffalo, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, ASSA 2026, NBER Labor Studies.

Publications

Network Structure and the Efficiency Gains from Mergers: Evidence from the U.S. Freight Railroads, The RAND Journal of Economics, 2026.
Finalist, Young Economists’ Essay Award, EARIE, 2023

A Structural Empirical Model of R&D, Firm Heterogeneity, and Industry Evolution, with Daniel Yi Xu, Journal of Industrial Economics, June, 2023 (Lead Article)

Work in Progress

Platform-Generated Quality Ratings: Theory, Empirics and Welfare Implications, with Jie Bai, Daniel Yi Xu, and Zhe Yuan

Abstract: In order to address the issue of asymmetric information and promote market regulation, digital platforms have implemented platform-generated rating (PGR) systems to provide quality information to the market. Unlike user-generated rating (UGR) systems, PGRs rely on platform-generated data including product quality, customer service, and logistics. To better understand the impact of PGRs, we conducted a study in collaboration with a large E-commerce platform, exploring both empirical and theoretical implications on consumer beliefs, sellers’ quality incentives, and market outcomes. Our empirical analysis utilized a regression-discontinuity method to examine customer response to high PGR sellers. Results indicate that customers tend to purchase more from high PGR sellers, suggesting that PGRs can be effective in signaling quality to consumers. We also found that the presence of a PGR system affects sellers’ quality incentives and the distribution of equilibrium quality. These findings demonstrate that PGRs have the potential to promote quality competition among sellers in the market. Finally, we conducted a counterfactual experiment to evaluate the welfare consequences of PGR adoption. Our (tentative) results suggest that PGR adoption can have a positive impact on overall welfare. Overall, our study highlights the potential benefits of PGRs in promoting market efficiency and enhancing consumer welfare.

• Presented at SUFE-Jinan IO Conference 2023, ASSA 2025, CES North America Conference 2024, IIOC 2025, EARIE 2025, University of Toronto (Empirical Micro, IO Summer Brownbag), SUNY Binghamton, VQMS, and Harvard Business School.

Who Bears the Risk of Extreme Weather? Capacity Allocation in U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines, with Emmanuel Murray-Leclair and Adam Wyonzek

Abstract: Who bears the risk when regulation requires some energy users to be insulated from extreme weather? We study the U.S. natural gas pipeline network, where capacity is allocated ex ante through priority contracts and a secondary release market before demand uncertainty is resolved. We develop a model of ex-ante capacity allocation and ex-post gas trade and show that efficiency requires shippers’ marginal valuations to rank identically across weather states—a condition that fails when users differ in weather sensitivity, as with gas peaking power plants. Peak-day demand regulation compounds the problem: intended to protect residential gas consumers, it induces gas utilities to hoard capacity, shifting scarcity risk onto gas-fired generators that also heat households; the two distortions interact superadditively. Using data on the universe of U.S. interstate primary-market contracts and secondary-market capacity-release transactions, and leveraging the staggered rollout of major cold waves, we find that concentrated capacity holdings predict sharply higher prices, lower released quantities, and persistent price dispersion across hubs.

• Presented at University of Toronto, Western University, the 2024 Canadian Economic Association Conference (CEA), and IIOC 2025

Platform of Platforms in Ride-Hailing, with Yao Luo and Zhe Yuan

Abstract: The platform economy has reshaped many business models. Platforms serve various purposes, including communication, networking, gaming, and services. However, many essential activities such as order management and payment are common to them, creating a new space for a platform of platforms (PoP). Despite the importance and fast development of PoP, many important research questions still need to be answered: how a PoP affects platform entry, and how different ownership structures affect the market power of platforms. This paper fills in the gap by analyzing the impacts of PoPs theoretically and empirically. We construct the first multi-sided market model of PoP, study its properties, and derive model implications. Second, we evaluate how PoP affects market equilibrium with an estimated structural model and analyze welfare implications for workers and consumers. Our empirical analysis studies PoP in the Chinese ride-hailing industry. Using data on prices and service availability for all ride-hailing platforms in all Chinese cities, we document three benefits of having a PoP. First, PoP has its own customer base, bringing extra network effects for all its affiliated operating platforms. Second, PoP pools all the customers and drivers together. As a result, once an operating platform joins the PoP, it can be matched with a larger potential set of customers and enjoy a greater cross-side network effect. Third, PoP offers the operating platforms an opportunity to enter the market at a lower cost. If an operating platform has a high entry cost, it will be more cost-effective to enter the market by joining the PoP rather than developing its own app.

• Funded by Insight Grant, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
• Presented at the Canadian Economic Association, University of Toronto (Summer Brownbag), 12th biennial Postal Economics Conference, IIOC 2024, ASSA 2025, and CES North America Conference 2024.

Other Publications

Mortality Decline, Retirement Age, and Aggregate Savings (with Sau-Him Paul Lau), Apr 2016, Macroeconomic Dynamics 20, no. 3: 715-736.

Optimizing the Scale of Markets for Water Quality Trading (with Martin W. Doyle, Lauren A. Patterson, Kurt E. Schnier, and Andrew J. Yates), Sep 2014, Water Resources Research 50.9: 7231-7244

Economic Incentives to Target Species and Fish Size: Prices and Fine-Scale Product Attributes in Norwegian Fisheries (with Frank Asche and Martin D. Smith), Dec 2014, ICES Journal of Marine Science 72, no. 3: 733-740.